Justice: A Lady In Distress *

EDWARD J. PHILBIN*'

Almost one hundred years ago a legal intellect, whose brilliance
still illuminates the professional paths along which contemporary
attorneys stumble, warned that there is little comprehension of how
large a part of our law is open to reconsideration with but a slight
change in the habit of the public mind.' It was clear in that era
to the Great Dissenter, as it should be generally evident to us today
but apparently is not, that unless the community at large submits to and permits itself to be governed by the law, then law and
all its high priests can instantaneously be blown away by a typhoon of rebellion, followed by the spectacle of a society gasping
2
for breath in a toxic anarchic atmosphere.
* This article is adapted from a paper presented to the Reflections On
and the Future of Justice Symposium held at San Diego, California on
May 18-21, 1972. This symposium was sponsored by the Director, Judge
Advocate Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps and supported by the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar Association and the National College of the State Judiciary, University of Nevada,
Reno, Nevada.
** Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, University of San Diego
School of Law. B.S., 1957, California State University, San Diego; J.D.,
1965, University of San Diego School of Law. Member, California Bar.
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The depository of power is and always has been unpopular, 3 but
the critical storm that is currently directed against our Lady of the
Common Law seems to transcend the usual twinge of discomfort
experienced by the weaker when gazing upon the stronger, however
benevolent the seat of authority may be. 4 The vexatious and even
insipid quality, if not the quantum, of community disenchantment
may be appreciated by a perusal of some of the simplistic criticisms
being hurled at our Lady. Some carping voices chorus that She is
blindfolded because She cannot bear to witness the injustices perpetrated in Her name, while others claim that Her eyes are not
merely covered but that She is completely blind to the machinations
and manipulations of corrupt opportunists operating under Her
very nose. Some idealists believe that Her sword is used to smite
the wicked, while the antithetical viewpoint is simultaneously
voiced that She uses Her cutlery only to skewer the common man
and to protect monolithic vested interests. Legal abstractionists
believe that She carries the scales to symbolize the balancing of
policy interests and the weighing of evidence for the universal
good. But bitter invective is also audible claiming that Her scales

are used to direct judgments in favor of those who deposit the greatest amount of gold in the balance. 5
In such a virulent atmosphere of dissent and rejection, the traditional, romanticized concepts of our Lady as a cool, poised, pure,
golden, sympathetic, detached, and unbiased dispenser of applied
justice make Her survivability as secure as a maid's virginity in a
cloister invaded by the hordes of Ghengis Khan. 6 If, in the eyes of
3. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906); Reprinted 20 J. AM. Ju.
Soc'y 178 (1937). "Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice is as
old as law

...

In other words, as long as there have been laws and law-

yers, conscientious and well-meaning men have believed that laws were
mere arbitrary technicalities, and that the attempt to regulate the relations of mankind in accordance with them resulted largely in injustice."
See also, B. DISRmE,

CONINsBY, bk. iv., ch. 11.

4. PouND, supra note 3, at 395. "But we must not be deceived by this
innocuous and inevitable discontent with all law into overlooking or underrating the real and serious dissatisfaction with courts and lack of respect
for law which exists in the United States today."
5. 0. GoLnsrvnTH, THE TRAVELLER. "Laws grind the poor, and the rich
men rule the law."
6. Letter from Edmund Burke to Hon. C.J. Fox, October 8, 1777.
People crushed by law have no hopes but from power. If laws

any significant segment of society She is ineffective to protect them,
to serve them in practice, whether or not such a belief is factual,
then can She and Her acolytes afford to delude themselves into
believing that the spittle aimed at Her is nothing more than a spring
rain?7 .8 If the answer of the legal profession is in the affirmative,
then I fear that that spittle will be the aqua regia that can dissolve
even a golden goddess such as this Lady of ours.
In other words, when contemporary examinations of our legal
system produce nothing more than recommendations for procedural reforms or inconsequential legislative modifications of the
substantive law, then nothing more is being accomplished than the
application of balm to the contusions of a Lady whose life is in danger, while simultaneously ignoring the diminution of Her vital signs.
The Lady desperately needs treatment for a possibly fatal illness.
Assuming that the minority which equates redress of grievances
with violent redaction of the judicial system can be and will be converted or corralled, then the virus threatening Her very existence is
apathy caused by a paucity of faith. Significant segments of our
societal structure apparently no longer believe that She can
or will protect them from predators, provide them with redress for
wrongs done to them, or vindicate them when they are unjustly
accused.
Disrespect for the judicial system is "the dagger of national suicide" and, according to some, is evidenced by two major manifestations: first, by criticism that the courts are too lenient with criminals, placing their rights above those of society; and, second, by
overt acts of disobedience, using coercion to enforce alleged rights
and selectively obeying only "just" laws. 10 For example, Judge
are their enemies, they will be enemies to laws; and those, who
have much to hope and nothing to lose, will always be dangerous,
more or less.
7. E. KAZAN, AEmmicA, A- EXCA (1961).
8. Limiting his analysis to civil justice, Dean Pound delineated four
classifications of the causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice, i.e., "(1) [clauses for dissatisfaction with any legal system,
(2) causes lying in the peculiarities of our Anglo-American legal system,
(3) causes lying in our American judicial organization and procedure and
(4) causes lying in the environment of our judicial administration."
Four aphorisms were distilled from the first classification: "(1) The necessarily mechanical operation of rules, and hence of laws; (2) the inevitable
difference in rate of progress between law and public opinion; (3) the
general popular assumption that the administration of justice is an easy
task, to which anyone is competent, and (4) popular impatience of restraint." 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
9. Dean Pound's thesis indicates that a more accurate phrase would be
"do not yet believe". See note 8, supra.
10. Address by Hon. Jack R. Levitt, Judge of the Superior Court of the
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Levitt of the Superior Court of the County of San Diego, believes
the former viewpoint to be rooted in emotionalism, and the latter
in moral, rather than material, poverty. Dean Pound implied that
the cause is practically congenital rather than being related to morality or emotionalism.
Another necessary source of dissatisfaction with judicial administration of justice is to be found in popular impatience of restraint. Law involves restraint and regulation, with the sheriff and
his posse in the background to enforce it. But, however necessary
and salutary this restraint, men have never been reconciled to it
entirely. The very fact that it is a compromise between the individual and his fellows makes the individual, who must abate some
part of his activities in the interest of his fellows, more or less restive. In an age of absolute theories, monarchical or democratic, this
restiveness is acute. A conspicuous example is to be seen in the
contest between the king and the common law courts in the seventeenth century. An equally conspicuous example is to be seen in
the attitude of the frontiersman toward state-imposed justice. "The
unthinking sons of the sage brush," says Owen Wister, "ill tolerate
anything which stands for discipline, good order and obedience;
and the man who lets another command him they despise. I can
think of no threat more evil for our democracy, for it is a fine
thing diseased and perverted, namely, the spirit of independence
gone drunk." This is an extreme case. But in a lesser degree the
feeling that each individual, as an organ of the sovereign democracy,
is above the law he helps to make, fosters everywhere a disrespect
for legal methods and institutions and a spirit of resistance to them.'1
I submit that there exists a third and potentially more dangerous
manifestation, namely, a general public ennui in the failures and
successes of the administration of justice, a modern version of the
ancient violin concerto in the midst of conflagration. 1 2 This community malaise stems from a feeling of exclusion from the legal process, an inability to partake in the cabalistic rituals of the professional initiates, and a suspicion that the public is merely required
to pay the bill for the privilege of being the expendable pawns in a
game designed by and for a continued legal aristocracy. 13 In short,

pervasive public ignorance of the methods, the objectives, and
State of California, County of San Diego, 12th Annual Pillars of American
Freedom series reported in the San Diego Evening Tribune, April 19, 1972.
11. 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
12. Berger, Do the Courts Communicate?, 55 JuDIcATuRE 318 (1972). See
also, Wilson, The Gulf Between the People and the Court, 8 Ta. JuDG.s'
J., 39 (1969).
13. "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." W. SnAmxsPE.AE,
KING HENRY VI Part 11, 1. iii.

the continuing development of the judicial system in all of its many
forms is the tap-root of indifference, hostility, and public desuetude.
Karl Llewellyn was amazed in 1942, during a period which for
Americans was the most traumatic and uncertain of the war years,
that there was "no competitive demand in the armed services for
law trained men" and "no fear among civilians that if the law men
(were) drafted the community must settle down to suffer for the

lack of them."' 4
Who is to bear the blame for this disaffection with the judicial
system, a disaffection based upon ignorance of the system and which
can be identified throughout the political spectrum from the ultraleft to the ultra-right, a societal jaundice whose bilious tinge tints
the economic continuum from the ragged to the rich; an ennui
which permeates all levels of intellectual experience from functional
illiterates to research scientists? 15 The answer to this rhetorical
question is complex and manifold but at least one facet of the problem requires that the major portion of the responsibility for the
existence of this public attitude, and the primary responsibility
for its eradication, must be shouldered by the Bench and the Bar. I
refer not just to those few mavericks, found in every stratum of
society and in every field of endeavour, who bring the entire legal
profession into disrepute by sharp dealing, unethical conduct, and
overt criminality, but also and primarily to those dedicated, eupractic legal professionals who regularly sacrifice personal pleasures
to keep abreast of the law, to adequately prepare their cases, and
who do their uttermost to protect their clients and to enhance the
profession and the judicial system. The finest members of the legal
profession are guilty of an act of omission, namely, a shattering silence by those most qualified to speak. Attorneys, for perfectly
plausible reasons do not take time, do not make time, to explain to
the layman what good the judicial system is doing for him, or why
it is doing something unpleasant to him, or how or why it is all occurring. But, regardless of the validity of the reasons for this failure to inform, the judicial system can no longer afford the luxury
of professional silence. 16
14. Llewellyn, The Crafts of Law Re-valued, 28 A.B.A.J. 801, 802

(1942). He was shattered "to find that in the eyes of laymen high and
low, military and civilian, our skills appear as badly worn spare tires,
neither appealing nor reliable, and suited in the national need for the
scrap pile to be remade into a make-shift something else."
15. Id. "That is one reason why our fellow Americans see us as useless,
save as rear rank privates: they do not even know what our craft is, they

do not dream of the value of the skilled law trouble-shooter in the welter

of a national reorganization."
16. Id. Referring to lack of communication between the profession and
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Every attorney who has ever practiced can review the roster of
past clients and find one for whom an acquittal was obtained in
a criminal case or for whom a judgment or satisfactory disposition was procured in a civil case, but who had not the vaguest notion of the amount of preparation by the attorney required to
achieve that result nor any appreciation of the years of personal
training and experience and the learning of centuries which cul-

minated in that vindication. He merely smiled, pleased but bewildered, as his advocate tore off down the courthouse corridor to
the next legal confrontation. If the victors are confused, ruminate
upon the state of mind of the other client, equally unenlightened,
who lost his civil case or was convicted of a crime. What, in his
miasma of ignorance, was his opinion of the judicial process?
To the layman, even to the legally semi-sophisticated venireman, an attorney's courtroom performance must appear to be an
atavistic ritual of obeisance to obscure shibboleths. 17 Should not
the layman who ultimately pays the bill for the judicial system in
one form or another be allowed a clear view of the Ark of the
Covenant? It appears that he is rapidly tiring of paying to see only
the curtain which obscures it. There are many indications that he
harbors serious doubts as to the utility of the Ark, if not possessed of a complete disbelief that it exists at all behind the shroud.
If this premise is correct, that is, that the epidemic of public disrespect for the judicial system is basically rooted in ignorance of it,
then there are a number of relatively simple, though difficult, remedies for the illness which can be immediately implemented. These
remedies can be categorized by reference to those segments of the
profession which must carry them into effect: the Bench, the Bar
and the Schools of Law. Let me briefly discuss them seriatim.
the public, Llewellyn said: "They will never know it (that the legal profession practices a craft of doing and getting things done with the law, instead of exercising a mere monopoly of knowledge of the law) nor will
nor can they draw the consequence, until (attorneys) first know it, then
become articulate about it, then act on it."
17. Id. "Yet the idea that the essence (of the legal craft) lies in this
peculiar knowledge of the law, that idea gives us a sort of standing, the
standing of monopolists in a secret lore; and it may be we have discovered
that the priests of any black art can make the uninitiate pay well for
mystic service."

Members of the Bench, especially those who preside over courts
of limited jurisdiction, occupy the most sensitive position within the
entire judicial system since it is before these tribunals that most
citizens unfortunate enough to ever have any direct dealings with
the legal system are exposed to the judicial process. It is after his
immersion in this milieu that the average citizen draws his conclusions as to the utility or futility of the entire legal process. As
a result of over-burdened calendars, over-worked judges and the
necessity to "keep it moving" and "clear the calendar", the average defendant is subjected, at best, to turnstile justice and is afforded little, if any, opportunity to tell what he considers in his
layman's concept of justice to be "his side of the story." Consequently, he leaves the courthouse frustrated and frustration leads
to hostility and hostility frequently results in violence. What an
opportunity has been lost! Had the judge been so disposed and had
he had the time, he could have heard the whole story, however

irrelevant to the material issues, and then explained briefly the
applicable legal doctrine and a fragmentary overview of the legal
system to the parties, perhaps in the process creating staunch adherents to our system of justice rather than bitter detractors. But to
dispose of relatively minor controversies in the suggested fashion
costs money in the form of more judges, more courtrooms, more
sensitivity and compassion and less computerized disposition of
pending matters. It is anomalous that though Americans have
given their lives for the ideal of justice, they will seldom leap forward to bear the economic cost of it. To overcome this fiscal
reluctance an attempt might be made to calculate the financial cost
to a society which seeks to create justice "on the cheap" or else,
may the gods protect us, to abandon it entirely.
These views dictate the conclusion that judges presiding over
courts of limited jurisdiction must be those who are the most
carefully selected by appointment or by the elective process, not
only for their legal expertise but also for their devotion to and
knowledge of the judicial process and their empathy with those
individuals drawn into it. Further, they must be willing to
attempt within the limits of human endurance and must be allowed
to settle controversies rather than to dispose of cases. Because of
their daily contact with the average citizen, this segment of the
Bench bears the greatest responsibility and has the greatest opportunity by the exercise of enlightened judicial craftsmanship for
demonstrating to the community that justice not only exists but is
also applied even-handedly to all, and in terms that both the victor
and vanquished can understand and, hopefully, will accept.
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Members of the Bench presiding over courts of general jurisdiction, because they deal with a -different cross-section of society
as a result of the subject-matter jurisdiction of these courts, must
exercise this duty of public education in a different manner. Litigants in these tribunals are normally represented by competent
counsel, and hence it should be the parties' counsel and not the
court's primary duty to explain the judicial process to the parties
appearing in these arenas. However, judges of courts of general
jurisdiction can and should assume the role of community educators
by clarifying controversial judicial holdings and also by defining
the objectives and mysteries of the judicial system to the communications media and hence to the public.' 8 Unfortunately for a
variety of reasons, the record of the Bench in this crucial endeavour
is spotty at best. If justice delayed is justice denied, then justice
misunderstood is justice misplaced. Some judges loathe to comment
on judicial decisions because of a restrictive viewpoint of the
requirements of judicial ethics. Others fear to influence cases which
may be further appealed, while still others refuse enlightening comment due to a desire to avoid creating personal public antagonism.
But a jurist need not express personal opinions as to the propriety of
a decision while explaining its ramifications and the process by
which the decision itself was reached. Is it really a breach of judicial ethics for a judge to allay public fear of mass releases of criminals on "technical" grounds 19 by explaining constitutionally pro-

tected rights, the purpose of the exclusionary rules of evidence, or
the policy determination to prevent convictions of innocent defendants found in suspicious circumstances? Can judicial silence in
the face of hysterical headlines and -disgust with the administration
of justice be justified upon any rational, professional, or ethical basis? Not only can it not be so justified, but the profession can no
longer afford, if it ever could, the implied snobbery of such alleged
professional detachment.
The second remedial category involves the practicing members of
the Bar who, as well as members of the Bench, are also officers of
18. Articles cited note 12 supra.
19. E.g., People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr.
152 (1972); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1966).

the court,2 0 a title frequently mouthed but infrequently utilized
as a basis for action. Members of the Bar bear as great a responsibility for education of the public as do members of the Bench.
Many, if not most, practitioners devote tremendous effort and time
which cannot easily be spared to the authoring of scholarly articles
for professional journals, to serving as members of public panels,
to setting up Law Day and similar activities designed to educate
the public, and to speaking before citizens groups. But in the macroscopic panorama these activities, considering their impact upon
public education, are microscopic. The most effective studentfaculty ratio which any legal education program can achieve is
one-to-one; every time an attorney cooperates with a client that
ratio is established.
With such an opportunity presented to him, the attorney should
assume the role of legal educator at some moment during the initial
interview and prepare his client for the latter's entry into the legal process by enumerating the steps which will be taken, why they
are necessary, how they will be initiated, the probable and the possible outcome at each procedural milestone, and what should be and
also what could be the ultimate result. This sounds like a very
time-consuming process and hence something in which the ordinary practitioner simply cannot afford to engage with the ordinary
client. No one will deny that medical practitioners are as pressed
for time, if not more so, than legal practitioners, but each doctor to
a varying degree, engages in a similar educational process with
each patient. They, however, call it applying the "bed-side manner". A layman, medically well but legally ill, seeking an attorney, is usually just as fearful, uncertain, and ignorant of the conse-

quences of his situation as is a medical patient. Does he not have
just as much right and perhaps as much need to be reassured as
far as is possible by his attorney's explanation of his situation and
his probable status, present and future? If a client is properly
prepared for his encounter with the judicial process, is he not more
likely to accept, if not agree with, the final result?
Members of the practicing Bar are remiss in another area of public education, a neglect to act where action is even more imperative.
If our legal institutions, based as they are upon freedom of judges
to decide according to the law as they perceive it, are to survive the
ignorant hysteria which frequently follows hard upon the heels of
unpopular judicial decisions, 2' then it is the duty of the Bar to voci20. 48 A.B.A.J. 25 et seq. (1962).
21. Cases cited note 19 supra.
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ferously defend the right and duty of the Bench to decide controversies free of pressure from any source, and to protect the Bench
from personal attack. The Bar need not meekly accept every tenet,
legal or otherwise, served up by the Bench, but it is certainly the
duty of the Bar to explain to the public the function of the courts in
creating case law and to vehemently defend the jurists, who usually
will not or cannot publicly answer in their own behalf, 22 against
imputations of ignorance, revenge, prejudice, weakness, stupidity,
political pressure, lack of patriotism, integrity, and mental competence and also suspicious parental origins.
Few attorneys have lost a case, meekly accepted the decision, and
still believed that the court was totally correct. But every member
of the Bar should know that it is far better to have a judge who
incorrectly but pressure-free decided a case, than to have a judge
who placed not only the law and the evidence but also his public
image and/or personal welfare in the decisional scales.2 3 Assuming
a competent, unbiased judge subjected to public abuse, then the
Bar, if only as a matter of professional self-interest, should rush
to the defense of the Bench's right and duty to deliver unpopular decisions, however much the members of the Bar may disagree with
the opinion and the determination. The Bar can hardly be described
as quixotic in such cases. As a result, the public has unjustly maligned individual judges and tribunals at the drop of a cliche, even
though the impetus for these attacks is frequently instigated by
demagogues who are always only too eager to reap the benefits of
popular dissent.
The final category involves members of the profession who have
directed their talents into the field of Legal Education. This category should, perhaps, be expanded to include all Educators rather
than merely those who are legally trained, since it is a forlorn hope
to expect the successful inculcation into the mind of a young adult
law student a respect for, if not a devotion to, a philosophical tradition to which the individual has had little if any exposure since
kindergarten. Students must be educated from the instant that they
are pried from their mother's nipple through the years spent in
22.

CALIFORI.A RULEs or CouRT, AiPEN'ix DIVISION

CIAL Enmcs, RuLEs 4, 12, 15 and 16.
23. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHIcs, RuLE 12.

2,

CANoNs or JUDI-

institutions of legal education, in the manner in which our legal
system operates, the torturous and sometimes blood-spattered routes
of its development, its strengths and weaknesses. Too often is the
puissance of our legal system palliated, if it is mentioned at all by
Educators. 24 Educators appear to be subject to a neurotic fascination with the weakness of the legal system or what are perceived
to be weaknesses. But every student is entitled to be exposed to
the complete picture, that is, our American system's origin, development, strengths, weaknesses, trends, reform movements, and comparisons of it with other legal systems, and then be allowed to personally judge the utility or futility of the juridical structure that
has been erected. Even in the training of law students there has
been a failure to do this as a result of the contemporary method
of emphasizing legal rules and analytical skills and ignoring the examination of law as a living process. 25 Fortunately, the current
trend in legal education is toward teaching law as such a process,
rather than merely as a fabric of rules in the abstract, but this
teaching technique must begin with the basics and far earlier in
the educational process than the law school. To achieve this end,
I am assuming that the non-legally trained Educators themselves
have some knowledge and understanding of our legal institutions,
an assumption which may be nothing more than a chimera.
Finally, even though these opinions may seem to indicate that I
believe that our present legal system is perfect and that education
is the panacea for restoring public faith in that system, I would be
the first to admit that inequities do exist and that reforms are
needed now and will constantly be needed in the future as our societal values change and develop. But as has been reiterated since
the time of the azure-tinted, troglodytic inhabitants of that embattled island which was the womb and birth place of our legal
system, the beauty of the common law is that it always has been
and still is flexible and amorphous and capable of absorbing changing conditions and standards. Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, our
own legal system may be the worst form of dispensing justice-except for all of the others. In order to save this system of applied
justice from destruction we must constantly explain it to the

citizenry it was designed to serve, and be certain that the legal
profession itself is ready, willing, and able to police its members
24. It is here assumed, but not decided, that most Educators believe

that our legal system is basically just and moral.
25. 28 A.B.A.J. 801, 802 (1942), "qt comes at a price ... of turning out
of law school prospective lawyers who know nothing but the law, and have
no simplest smattering of how to lawyer." (Emphasis in the original).
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and eliminate injustice within the system, whenever and wherever
it is found.

2

27

'

26. The concepts presented here are obviously not solely those of the
author. However, the problem still exists and is perhaps becoming exacerbated despite reiterated pleas for remedial action. See, e.g., President's
Column, American Trial Lawyers Association Newsletter, Vol. 15, No. 2,
at 49.
27. "Justice has been conceived historically in two separate ways: as a
supramundane eternal ideal which is independent of man, and as a temporal man-made social idea. The two meanings illustrate the difference
between contemplation and action, philosophical reflection and practical
conduct." M. Fo0KoscH, Justice, in the forthcoming DICTIONARY OF THE
HISTORY OF IDEAS (Scribners Sons, New York, 1972), 5 vols. All references
to the concept of justice in this article are meant to connote the latter
meaning in Professor Forkosch's statement.

